Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary Evidence: Is the Proposed Amendment to Rule 52(a) the Correct Solution by Robins, Kevin P.
Volume 30 Issue 1 Article 5 
1985 
Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary Evidence: Is 
the Proposed Amendment to Rule 52(a) the Correct Solution 
Kevin P. Robins 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Evidence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kevin P. Robins, Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary Evidence: Is the Proposed 
Amendment to Rule 52(a) the Correct Solution, 30 Vill. L. Rev. 227 (1985). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss1/5 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1985]
REVIEW OF FINDINGS OF FACT BASED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE: IS
THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 52(a) THE CORRECT
SOLUTION?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court, pursuant to congressional authorization, de-
veloped the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the purpose of uniting
law and equity practices in the federal court system.' The fusion of
these two systems, however, has not been completely successful. There
exists considerable controversy and confusion among the circuit courts
of appeals over the proper standard of appellate review for district
courts' findings of fact based on documentary or undisputed evidence in
nonjury cases.
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs
the standard of review for all civil actions tried in district court without a
jury or with only an advisory jury, provides that "[f]indings of fact shall
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the
witnesses."'2 While rule 52(a) literally applies to all findings of fact,
some courts, relying on past equity practice, apply a de novo standard of
review to findings of fact based on documentary or undisputed evi-
dence.3 These courts refuse to invoke rule 52(a), claiming that the rule
does not explicitly state that it is applicable to findings of fact based on
documentary evidence. 4 To resolve this conflict, the Advisory Commit-
1. Order ofJune 3, 1935, 295 U.S. 774 (1935) (pursuant to Act ofJune 19,
1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064). The congressional act granted the Supreme Court
power to "unite the general rules prescribed by [the Supreme Court] for cases in
equity with those in actions at law so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure
for both ....... Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (emphasis added).
The new rules, however, were to maintain "inviolate the right of trial by jury in
accordance with the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States and without altering substantive rights." Order of June 3, 1935, 295 U.S.
at 774.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). The Supreme Court has stated that "[a] finding is
'clearly erroneous' when . . . the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). See also
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969); Com-
missioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960).
3. For a discussion of courts of appeals which apply a de novo standard of
review to findings of fact based on documentary evidence, see infra notes 114-42
and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of the conflicting standards of review applied by the
courts of appeals, see infra notes 74-167 and accompanying text.
In discussing the circuits' conflicting approaches to the proper standard of
review, most commentators favor application of the clearly erroneous standard
(227)
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tee for the Rules of Civil Procedure recently proposed an amendment to
rule 52(a) which provides that the clearly erroneous standard of rule
52(a) applies whether evidence is oral or documentary. 5
This note will examine the historical development of the standards
of review at law and in equity in order to understand how the contro-
versy began. It will then discuss the impact of rule 52(a) on these prior
standards, especially in terms of the appropriate standard of review for
documentary evidence. Additionally, this note will examine the various
standards of review adopted by the circuit courts of appeals. Finally, the
note will analyze the Advisory Committee for the Civil Rules' formal
proposal to amend rule 52(a) and the impact that it already has had on
some circuit courts of appeals, as well as the effect it will have in the
future as it operates to eliminate the confusion over the appropriate
standard of review of findings of fact based on documentary evidence.
II. HISTORY OF LAW AND EQUITY REVIEW
A. Traditional Distinctions Between Law and Equity
Prior to the establishment of the federal judicial system in the
United States, England and most of the colonies separated suits into two
forms of actions: actions at law and actions in equity. 6 In actions at law,
findings of fact were made by a jury after hearing testimony in open
court, whereas in equity, findings of fact were made by a judge on the
basis of purely documentary evidence. 7 In actions at law, appellate re-
view was taken by a "writ of error"; in equity, review was taken by an
"appeal." '8 Upon a writ of error, appellate review was limited to ques-
when the district court's findings are based solely upon documentary evidence.
See Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural Codes and Rules, 3
VAND. L. REV. 493, 505-06 (1950) (Judge Clark was the reporter to Advisory
Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure); Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Ap-
pellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 764-71 (1957); Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate
Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REV.
506 (1963). But see 5AJ. MOORE &J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 52.04
(2d ed. 1984).
5. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a)
(July 1984). The amendment to rule 52(a) provides: "Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the
credibility of the witness." Id. (emphasis in original).
6. See R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 38, 101-02 (1941);
Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L.
REV. 49, 96 (1923). In 1787, there were no equity (chancery) courts in Connect-
icut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Georgia. Warren,
supra, at 96.
7. See 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 257-59, 354-58
(1926); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *438 (The mode of trial was "by in-
terrogatories administered to the witnesses, upon which their depositions are
taken in writing .... ").
8. A. DOBIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE § 222, at 903 (1928). A
writ of error is a common law writ issued by a higher court to review questions of
[Vol. 30: p. 227228
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tions of law apparent on the record, while on an appeal, review could be
had of questions of both law and fact.9 Moreover, on appeal of a suit in
equity, findings of fact and law were reviewed de novo, unlike actions at
law, where the jury's findings of fact were conclusive on review and only
the trial judge's conclusions of law apparent on the record could be re-
viewed by the appellate court.10 This distinction between review of ac-
tions at law and in equity was justified on the ground that in suits in
equity where the evidence was completely documentary, the reviewing
court was in the same position as the trial court in terms of examining
the evidence on which the factual findings were based."l
After the American revolution, the parameters of the American fed-
eraljudicial system were set forth in the United States Constitution. Ar-
ticle III granted the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over questions
of law and fact subject to regulation by Congress. 12 Fearing that this
provision would endanger the common law right to trial by jury and the
conclusiveness of ajury's findings of fact upon writ of error, 13 antifeder-
alists promoted and secured the adoption of the seventh amendment,
which protects a jury's findings of fact, 14 but leaves Congress the task of
law apparent on the record. Id. An appeal is a civil law process whereby the
appellant takes steps necessary to have both questions of law and fact reviewed
in an appellate court. Id. at 905-06.
9. Id. at 903-06. See also Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796)
("An appeal is a process of civil law origin, and removes a cause entirely; sub-
jecting the fact as well as the law, to a review and retrial: but a writ of error is a
process of common law origin, and it removes nothing for re-examination but
the law."). See also R. POUND, supra note 6, at 298 (in equity, "a party was not
precluded from taking a ground in the higher court which he had not suggested
below").
10. A. DOBIE, supra note 8, § 222, at 906; R. POUND, supra note 6, at 298
("an appeal in equity was a hearing of the case de novo").
11. Clark & Stone, Review of Findings of Fact, 4 U. Ciii. L. REV. 190, 204
(1937). These commentators suggested that depositions "could be examined by
the appellate court as fairly and easily as by the trial court .... ." Id.
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. Article III, § 2 of the Constitution states
that "the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
make." Id.
13. Antifederalists feared that placing the jury's verdict in the hands of an
unfriendly federal appellate court would nullify the right to a jury trial. To anti-
federalists, the jury was the symbol of freedom from an arbitrary central govern-
ment. See Clark & Stone, supra note 11, at 192 (citing Martin, Secret Proceedings
and Debates of the Federal Convention 80-81 (1787); John Dickinson, Letter of
Favius on the Federal Constitution 1788; Elbridge Gerry Pamphlets (Boston
1788); Richard Henry Lee, Letters of a Federal Farmer to a Republican (New
York October 12, 1787); George Mason, Objections Addressed to the Citizens
of Virginia; John Winthrop, Essays of Agrippa, reprinted in Mass. Gazette, Dec.
11, 1787).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend VII. The seventh amendment provides that "no
fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law." Id. The Supreme Court
has stated that facts found by a jury may only be tried anew upon a grant of a
22919851 NOTES
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determining the proper scope of federal appellate review in nonjury set-
tings such as suits in equity.
Acting pursuant to constitutional authorization, Congress subse-
quently enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789 (Judiciary Act)' 5 which pro-
vided for review in equity cases by writ of error instead of by the
traditional appeal. 16 TheJudiciary Act also replaced the equity eviden-
tiary procedure of taking testimony by deposition with an examination
of witnesses in open court. 17 As a result, in reviewing findings of fact
made by the trial court in equitable actions, the appellate court was
forced to rely on whatever credibility or reliability determinations were
made by the court below.' 8 The net effect of the passage of the Judiciary
Act was to limit review in all federal cases, including cases in equity, to
questions of law only, making findings of fact conclusive on review, con-
sistent with traditional actions at law. 19
new trial by the trial court as ordered by an appellate court for error in law.
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13 (1899).
15. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. This Act was entitled "An Act
to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States." Id.
16. Id. § 22, 1 Stat. 84. Section 22 provided that "final decrees and judg-
ments in civil actions in a district court. . . may be re-examined, and reversed
or affirmed in a circuit court, . . . upon a writ of error ...... Id. Through this
provision, the drafters attempted to allay the fears of critics of the Constitution,
who considered the vesting in the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over
facts and law violative of the right to trial by jury. See Warren, supra note 6, at
102. Instead of limiting the writ of error to actions at law, however, the drafters
extended it to equity cases even though critics of the Constitution conceded that
de novo review of law and fact on appeal was proper in equity cases. Id.
17. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 30, 1 Stat. 88 (1789). The Judiciary Act pro-
vided that "the mode of proof by oral testimony and examination of witnesses in
open court shall be the same in all the courts of the United States, as well in the
trial of causes in equity . . . as of actions at common law." Id. TheJudiciary Act
only allowed for the taking of depositions when a person 1) lived more than 100
miles from the place of trial; 2) was leaving the United States; or 3) was "ancient
or infirm." Id. The Judiciary Act further limited equity's powers by providing
that the trial court's findings of fact were to appear on the record. Id. § 19, 1
Stat. 83. These provisions were a triumph for the antichancery party, which
wanted to limit equity powers. This was due in part to pre-Revolution senti-
ments against English equity courts and the fact that only some of the colonies
employed chancery courts. Warren, supra note 6, at 96-100.
18. See Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796). In Wiscart, the Court
was presented with the question of the appropriate standard of review in equity
cases. In holding that all findings of fact were conclusive on review, Chief Jus-
tice Elsworth stated that "although the personal attendance of witnesses could
easily be procured in the District or Circuit Courts, the difficulty of bringing
them from the remotest parts of the union to the seat of the government, was
insurmountable, and, therefore, it became necessary, in every description of
suits, to make a statement of the facts in the Circuit Court definitive ...... Id.
at 329.
19. Id. at 329. The Wiscart Court emphasized that "the law directs that in
cases of appeal, part shall be decided by one tribunal, and part by another; the
facts by the court below, and the law by this court. Such a distribution ofjuris-
diction has long been established in England." Id.
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Congress' attempt in the Judiciary Act to apply the rules and proce-
dures of review at law to actions in equity met strong criticism. 20 In
1802, Congress, led by the antifederalist party, enacted legislation pro-
viding that "in all suits in equity, it shall be in the discretion of the
court . . . to order the testimony of witnesses therein to be taken by
depositions .... .21 In 1803, Congress reinstated appeals for equity
cases and declared that a "transcript of the libel, bill, answer, deposi-
tions, and all other proceedings . . . shall be transmitted to the said
supreme court; and . . . no new evidence shall be received in the said
court on the hearing of such appeal .... -22 As a result, Congress
effectively rejuvenated traditional equity practice. 23
Review of actions at law and in equity remained distinct until 1865,
when Congress enacted legislation permitting waiver of jury trials'in ac-
tions at law. 24 This legislation gave birth to a hybrid cause of action: in
substance the action remained an action at law, but in form it resembled
an action in equity. 2 5 The trial judge made findings of both fact and law,
20. Clark & Stone, supra note 11, at 194. The authors noted: "The attack
of the chancery lawyers upon the system arose from a justifiable pride in the
integrity of their own system, goaded on by the ancient rivalry between the two
systems of courts [law and equity] .... " Id.
21. Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 25, 2 Stat. 156, 166. The antifederalists
distrusted the federal judiciary and were opposed to its attempt to converge law
and equity. See Clark & Stone, supra note 11, at 196. So great was the antifeder-
alists' deference to state powers that the Act of 1802 also provided that
depositions shall be taken in conformity to the regulations prescribed
by law for the courts of the highest original jurisdiction in equity, in
cases of a similar nature, in that state . . . ; Provided however, that noth-
ing herein contained shall extend to the circuit courts which may be
holden in those states, in which testimony in chancery is not taken by
deposition.
Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 25, 2 Stat. at 166 (emphasis in original).
22. Act of March 3, 1803, ch. 40, § 2, 2 Stat. 244 (1803 Act). The 1803 Act
expressly repealed the sections of the Judiciary Act which came within its pur-
view. Id. Discussing the impropriety of the application of the writ of error to
equity cases, Chief Justice Taney stated that "the writ of error . . . is inconve-
nient and embarrassing when used as process to remove decrees in chancery
[equity] and admiralty to a superior court." Hemmenway v. Fisher, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 255, 258-59 (1857).
23. See The San Pedro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 132, 140 (1817). The Court
interpreted the 1803 Act as a remedy for the defect of the Judiciary Act by pro-
viding that, instead of transmitting the lower court's findings to the appellate
court, "the evidence (instead of the facts) should accompany the record into the
appellate court. . . . The remedy by appeal . . . brings before the supreme
court the facts as well as the law." Id. at 140. See also Note, supra note 4, at 508 &
n.18.
24. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 4, 13 Stat. 500, 501 (1865 Act). The
1865 Act provided that "issues of fact in civil cases in any circuit court of the
United States may be tried and determined by the court without the intervention
of a jury, whenever the parties, or their attorneys of record, file a stipulation in
writing with the clerk of the court waiving a jury." Id.
25. R. POUND, supra note 6, at 225-26; Clark & Stone, supra note 11, at 197-
19851 NOTES
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and the reviewing court was freed from the command of the seventh
amendment that a jury's finding of fact be conclusive on review.2 6 To
obviate confusion over the applicable standard of review, Congress pro-
vided that the findings of fact by the court had the same effect as those
made by a jury, and therefore findings of fact by a judge, at law, were
conclusive on review. 2 7
B. Development of "Modern" Federal Equity Practice
During the early twentieth century, several changes occurred in eq-
uity procedure that altered the traditional practice of de novo review in
equity cases. The major change occurred in 1912, when the Supreme
Court promulgated revised rules of equity.2 8 In contrast to the earlier
procedure, Equity Rule 46 required testimony to be taken in open court,
except in certain limited situations. 29 Due to this rule, the trial judge
began to make credibility determinations in equity cases, and circuit
26. For a discussion bf the seventh amendment, see supra note 14 and ac-
companying text. See also Clark & Stone, supra note 11, at 198.
27. Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 4, 13 Stat. 500, 501. The 1865 Act
provided that "[t]he finding of the court upon the facts, which finding may be
either general or special, shall have the same effect as the verdict of a jury." Id.
The 1865 Act further provided for review to the Supreme Court "upon a writ of
error, or upon appeal .... " Id. See Boogher v. Insurance Co., 103 U.S. 90, 97
(1880) ("For all purposes of our review the facts as found and stated by the
court below are conclusive."); Basset v. United States, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 38, 40
(1869) ("[W]hen the court, by permission of the parties, takes the place of the
jury, its finding of facts is conclusive, precisely as if a jury had found them by
verdict.").
Furthermore, the 1865 Act provided that review of special findings (specific
findings of fact) "may also extend to the determination of the sufficiency of the
facts found to support the judgment." Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 4, 13 Stat.
at 501. See Boogher, 103 U.S. at 97 ("We have often held that the act of 1865...
does not permit us to consider the effect of the evidence of the case, but only to
determine whether the facts found on the trial below are sufficient to support
the judgment. ... ). Thus, review of special findings did not include a deter-
mination of whether the findings of fact were supported by the weight of the
evidence, but only whether the facts were sufficient to support thejudgment. See
Clark & Stone, supra note 11, at 198.
28. Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S.
627 (1912). The lines of departure from the earlier equity rules were in the
direction of simplifying pleadings, speeding actions, and lessening the cost of
taking testimony and of taking appeal. SeeJ. HOPKINS, FEDERAL Eorrv RULES 34
(8th ed. 1933).
29. Equity R. 46, 226 U.S. 661 (1912). Equity Rule 46 provided that "[i]n
all trials in equity the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court,
except as otherwise provided by statute or these rules." Id. Equity Rule 47 pro-
vided that "[t]he court, upon application of either party, when allowed by stat-
ute, or for good and exceptional cause for departing from the general rule, to be
shown by affidavit, may permit the deposition of named witnesses ...... Eq-
uity R. 47, 226 U.S. 661, 661-62 (1912) (emphasis added).
Equity Rule 46 restored the provision of the Judiciary Act whereby testi-
mony was taken in open court in all cases, with limited exceptions. Clark &
Stone, supra note 11, at 203-04; Note, supra note 4, at 510.
232 [Vol. 30: p. 227
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courts generally accepted the trial court's findings of fact unless the find-
ings were "clearly wrong." 30 Circuit courts further weakened de novo
review of findings of fact by refusing to disturb the lower court's find-
ings of fact if the findings were based on conflicting evidence.3 1 The
courts, however, never applied these rules to cases tried solely on the
basis of documentary evidence. 32 Where the evidence was entirely doc-
umentary, circuit courts continued to give little or no weight to the trial
judge's findings of fact. 33
30. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Simons, 60 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 648 (1932) ("[F]acts found by the DistrictJudge will be accepted
by this court, unless the findings appear to be clearly wrong."). See also Mitchell
v. Investment Sec. Corp., 67 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1933) (fully recognizing the rule
that though "on an appeal in equity the reviewing court is not bound by the trial
court's findings of fact, his findings ought not to be disturbed unless their error
is clearly shown..."); United States ex rel. Charley v. McGowen, 62 F.2d 955,
957 (9th Cir.), afdper curiam, 290 U.S. 592 (1933) ("[W]here the witnesses tes-
tify in person before the trial judge he is in a better position to pass upon the
credibility ...and we will follow the decision of the trial judge unless it is
clearly apparent that his decision is erroneous.").
Prior to 1912, oral testimony was occasionally taken in equity cases. In
these instances, courts showed deference to the trial judge's or master's findings
of fact. See Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 525 (1888) ("[T]he [findings of fact]
should have been treated as so far correct and binding as not to be disturbed,
unless clearly in conflict with the weight of the evidence. ... ); Metropolitan
Nat'l Bank v. Rogers, 53 F. 776, 779 (3d Cir. 1893) ("[W]e must assume, prima
facie, [that the findings of fact] are correct, and as such must be [up]held, unless
error, plain and manifest, be shown."). After the promulgation of the Equity
Rules in 1912, oral testimony became the rule rather than the exception in ac-
tions in equity. See Clark & Stone, supra note 11, at 204; Note, supra note 4, at
510-11 & n.27.
31. See, e.g., Moss v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 71 F.2d 795, 797 (8th Cir.
1934) (when there is "a decided conflict in the evidence, . . . under the well
settled rule of this court, the findings of the Chancellor should not be dis-
turbed"); Fienup v. Kleinman, 5 F.2d 137, 141 (8th Cir. 1925) (findings of fact
are presumptively correct when the trial court has considered conflicting evi-
dence); Butte & Superior Copper Co. v. Clark-Montana Realty Co., 248 F. 609,
616 (9th Cir. 1918) ("Upon settled principles, which this court has always recog-
nized, findings so made upon conflicting testimony are conclusive upon this
appeal.").
32. See Paraffine Cos. v. McEverlast, Inc., 84 F.2d 335, 339 (9th Cir. 1936)
("there is no presumption in favor of the trial court's findings" when the evi-
dence is entirely in the form of depositions); Rown v. Brake Testing Equip.
Corp., 38 F.2d 220, 223-24 (9th Cir. 1930) ("All the testimony upon the issue
having been taken ...by deposition, the presumption in support of findings
based upon conflicting testimony in court does not prevail.").
33. See, e.g., Kaeser & Blair, Inc. v. Merchant's Ass'n, 64 F.2d 575, 576 (6th
Cir. 1933) (finding based on exhibits; therefore, the appellate court could not
"give to the finding the weight that attaches to a finding of fact where the court
has heard witnesses in open court, but must draw its own deductions and con-
clusions from an examination of the exhibits"); Nashua Mfg. Co. v. Berenzweig,
39 F.2d 896, 897 (7th Cir. 1930) ("Where all the evidence consists of affidavits,
pleadings, and exhibits, this court is in the same position as the District Court to
make deductions and conclusions."); Photoplay Publishing Co. v. La Verne Pub-
lishing Co., 269 F. 730, 732 (3d Cir. 1921) (rule that appellate court must accept
trial court's findings of fact did not apply when the evidence was documentary);
7
Robins: Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary Evidence: Is the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
C. Formation of Rule 52(a)
When the Supreme Court proceeded to unite law and equity under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1935, the drafters determined
that a uniform standard of review was needed for all nonjury cases. 34
After an examination of standards applied by the federal courts, the Ad-
visory Committee on 'the Rules of Civil Procedure (Advisory Committee)
recognized three possible alternatives: 1) to maintain the existing sys-
tem of review for nonjury cases, and to continue to apply different stan-
dards for nonjury actions at law and in equity; 2) to adopt the standard
of review for actions at law for both types of nonjury cases, thereby pro-
viding that all findings of fact are conclusive upon review; or 3) to pre-
scribe full de novo review for all nonjury cases in accordance with
traditional equity review. 35 Theq preliminary draft of the rule adopted
the third choice and provided that findings of fact "shall have the same
effect as that heretofore given to findings of suits in equity. ' '3 6 This
see also Clark & Stone, supra note 11, at 208 ("reviewing court in equity cases
distinguishes ...between those [findings] based on oral testimony given in
open court and those based on written documents and depositions").
34. See Hearings on the Federal Rules and H.R. 8892 Before the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 122 (1938). At the hearings before the House
Judiciary Committee, the Secretary of the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee
stated that "[t]he union of law and equity procedure made it necessary for the
rules to deal with this question in order that, on appeal in a nonjury case, the
question of whether the case was one of a legal or of an equitable nature might
not cause trouble." Id. (remarks of Edgar B. Tolman, Secretary of the Supreme
Court's Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedures). Additionally, the
Advisory Committee indicated that "a large measure of the advantage of that
union [of law and equity] will thus be lost by retaining a divided practice on
appeal unless these rules can declare an effect to the findings [of fact] other than
that now existing." FED. R. Civ. P. note to the Supreme Court, at 121 (Prelimi-
nary Draft 1936) [hereinafter cited as 1936 Draft]. For a discussion of review of
nonjury cases at law, see supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
35. The 1936 Draft postulated the following three alternatives:
The first is to retain the present system of review, viz., that in jury-
waived cases, the findings of fact shall have the same effect as the ver-
dict of a jury in an action at law; while in equity cases, the findings of
fact are reviewable as to the weight of the supporting evidence as well
as the sufficiency. . . .The second solution is to provide that the find-
ings of fact in all cases should be reviewed in the same way, and that
they should have the same effect as the verdict of a jury . . . . The
third is the system here proposed in Rule 68 [now Rule 52(a)], whereby
the review in jury-waived cases is made that of the equity practice, thus
leaving all cases tried without a jury to be fully reviewed on appeal.
1936 Draft, at 120-21.
36. 1936 Draft at 118. The Advisory Committee reasoned that the third
choice-review as in equity-'"fulfills the mandate of the statute, while also abol-
ishing the ancient procedural distinctions on review for a natural division which
preserves the jury trial intact, but leaves all other trials subject to complete re-
view." Id. at 121. In rejecting the first choice-separate review of law and eq-
uity-the Advisory Committee stated that "[t]he objection to this is that it
perpetrates tht very procedural distinctions we are attempting to abolish." Id.
at 120. The Advisory Committee rejected the second choice-facts conclusive
234 [Vol. 30: p. 227
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proposal, however, sharply divided the legal community;" 7 as a result,
the rule was changed in the 1937 draft to read as it does today.3 8 In
providing that "[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous," 39 the Advisory Committee chose a standard which seemed
to be a compromise between review at law and in equity. While this
standard does not permit appellate courts to conduct de novo review of
findings of fact consistent with traditional equity practices, it does allow
some examination of factfindings, which was not permitted in review of
actions at law.
40
review in all nonjury cases-because "[s]uch treatment, though providing for a
uniform and simple method of review and fulfilling the mandate of our enabling
statute has not met with approval by a majority of the Committee." Id. at 120-
21.
37. Immediately after the proposed rules were released, a spirited contro-
versy erupted over proposed rule 68 (now, as reworded, rule 52(a)). See Ches-
nut, Analysis of Proposed New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 22 A.B.A.J. 533, 540-
41, 572 (1936). Judge Chesnut did not believe that a desire to promote uni-
formity in all nonjury cases was sufficient "to justify such a radical change." Id.
at 540. He asserted that the only way complete uniformity could be achieved was
to give finality to all findings of fact, when there was substantial evidence to
support the findings, as in review at law. Id. at 541. Judge Chesnut posited
several reasons in support of his position: a judge was as qualified as a jury to
determine the facts; a cold record could not duplicate the nature of the case, and
the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses; expanded review would reduce
the tendency to encourage waiver of jury trials; appeals in nonjury cases would
be increased; and the effect would be to increase the size of the record. Id. at
540-41. Judge Chesnut admitted, however, that his opinion could be somewhat
biased because he was a district judge. Id. at 540.
Dean Clark, the Reporter of the Advisory Committee, also came out against
the proposed rule and in favor of the extension of at law review to equity cases.
See Clark & Stone, supra note 11, at 215-17. Professor Blume responded to
Judge Chesnut by asserting that findings of a judge are not given less weight
than the verdict of a jury. Blume, Review of Facts in Non-Juiy Cases, 20 JUDICATURE
68, 71 (1936). He noted that a jury verdict can be reviewed by the trial judge
upon a motion for new trial. Id. Professor Blume also asserted that a reviewing
court is in a better position because the court can give due regard to demeanor
evidence and then "study at length a verbatim record of conflicting testimony."
Id. at 72. Professor Blume characterized the role of the reviewing court in equity
as an "examin[ation of] the result in the light of the evidence to see ifjustice has
been done." Id. at 72-73. In a reply to Professor Blume, Dean Clark succinctly
summarized the case for review at law: "It gives dignity and responsibility to the
trial court, it affords all the opportunity needed for the appellate court to reverse
for substantial error or failure ofjustice, it does not keep alive a divided system,
and it does not hold out so extensive an invitation for appeals." Clark, Letter to
the Editor, 20 JUDICATURE 129, 130 (1936). This controversy may have been
one reason that the Advisory Committee ultimately sought a compromise. See
supra note 36.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 59 (Proposed Draft 1937) (current version at FED. R.
Civ. P. 52(a)) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rules].
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
40. Prior to 1937, findings of fact in jury or nonjury actions at law were
conclusive on review if there was any evidence to support the findings, while
equity review was in principle a de novo review, although deference was afforded
a lower court's findings of fact when based upon oral or conflicting testimony.
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Although, on its face, rule 52(a) appears to provide that the clearly
erroneous standard governs review of findings of fact in all nonjury
cases, the Note of the Advisory Committee on Rules to the final draft of
Rule 52 (Advisory Note) and the existing version of rule 52(a) lend
much confusion to a seemingly straightforward rule. First, the Advisory
Committee stated that the provision requiring application of the clearly
erroneous standards "accords with the decisions on the scope of the re-
view in modern federal equity practice."' 4 1 In the twentieth century, however,
modern federal equity practice dictated that the reviewing court apply
full de novo review to findings of fact based upon documentary evi-
dence.4 2 Second, the Advisory Committee stated that the clearly erro-
neous provision applied
to all classes of findings in cases tried without a jury whether
the finding is of a fact concerning which there was conflict of
testimony, or of a fact deduced or inferred from uncontradicted
testimony.43
Third, the cases cited by the Advisory Committee in the explanatory
note support application of both the clearly erroneous and de novo stan-
dards of review. 44 Although the Advisory Committee explicitly stated
For a discussion of review of findings of fact at law and in equity, see supra notes
6-27 and accompanying text. The "clearly erroneous" standard appeared to im-
itate the "clearly wrong" standard developed in equity cases involving oral
testimony.
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 52 advisory committee note (emphasis added). For a
discussion of federal equity practice up to 1936, see supra notes 28-33 and ac-
companying text.
42. See, e.g., Kaeser & Blair, Inc. v. Merchant's Ass'n, 64 F.2d 575, 576 (6th
Cir. 1933) (when evidence was solely in the form of documents the court "must
draw its own deductions and conclusions from an examination of the exhibits");
Nashua Mfg. Co. v. Berenzweig, 39 F.2d 896, 897 (7th Cir. 1930) (when evi-
dence is documentary, "this court is in the same position as the District Court to
make deductions and conclusions"). See also Clark & Stone, supra note 11, at
208.
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee note (emphasis added). Pro-
fessor Wright has interpreted this language to encompass findings of fact based
on nondemeanor or documentary evidence. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2587 (1971). See also Note, supra note 4, at 514-15 &
n.48 (when the emphasized phrase was added "the Committee moved closer to
the law type of review than its statement that the rule accorded with 'modern
federal equity practice' would indicate").
44. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee note (citing as direct au-
thority Warren v. Keep, 155 U.S. 265, 267 (1894) (in patent infringement suit in
which conflicting evidence was presented, Court held that "[a]s no obvious error
or mistake has been pointed to us, the [lower court's and master's] conclusions
must be permitted to stand"); Furrer v. Ferris, 145 U.S. 132, 134 (1892) (finding
of no negligence, while "not conclusive, it is very persuasive in this court");
Tilghman v. Poctor, 125 U.S. 136, 149-50 (1888) (in reviewing the master's find-
ings of fact based upon conflicting testimony, Court held that the findings "have
every reasonable presumption in their favor, and are not to be set aside or modi-
fied unless there clearly appears to have been an error or mistake on his part");
10
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that the clearly erroneous test was applicable when the evidence was
documentary in an Advisory Note accompanying a proposed amend-
ment to rule 52(a), 4 5 the amendment and its accompanying Advisory
Note were not adopted by the Supreme Court.4 6 In light of this ambigu-
ity, the courts have disagreed over the appropriate standard of review
for a trial court's findings of fact based solely on documentary
evidence. 4 7
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF RULE 52(A)
A. Supreme Court Interpretations
The Supreme Court first addressed the application of the clearly
erroneous standard of review in United States v. United States Gypsum Co. 
4 8
In Gypsum, the government sued defendants for violations of the Sher-
man Act.49 The government introduced evidence consisting of license
agreements, over 600 documents, and the testimony of twenty-eight wit-
nesses. 5 0 A three-judge court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. 5 1
Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 525 (1899) (findings of a master should not be
disturbed "unless clearly in conflict with the weight of the evidence upon which
they were made"); Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Silver King Consol. Min-
ing Co., 204 F. 166, 177 (8th Cir.) (where the evidence was evenly balanced,
court applied rule that "where a court has considered conflicting evidence, and
made a finding or decree, it is presumptively correct, and unless . . . some seri-
ous mistake of fact has been made, the finding or decree must be permitted to
stand"), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 624 (1913)) (citing as comparative authority Kaeser
& Blair, Inc. v. Merchants' Ass'n, 64 F.2d 575, 576 (6th Cir. 1933) (reviewing
finding of unfair competition based entirely upon exhibits, court concluded that
it could not "give to the findings the weight that attaches to a finding of fact
where the court has heard witnesses in open court, but must draw its own deduc-
tions and conclusions from an examination of the exhibits"); Dunn v. Trefry,
260 F. 147 (1st Cir. 1919) (reviewing finding that domicile was changed, court
stated that when there is no conflict of evidence, the rule that the finding stood
unless "clearly wrong" was applicable)). See also Note, supra note 4, at 515-16 &
n.51.
45. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52 advisory committee note (Proposed Amendments
1955) (reprinted in 5AJ. MOORE &J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 52.01
(2d ed. 1884)). In the 1955 proposed amendments, the Advisory Committee
expressly rejected the practice of "de novo" review of cases in which the testi-
mony was by deposition or the evidence was documentary, concluding that the
clearly erroneous test was not modified by the language which follows it ("due
regard shall be given") but was applicable in all cases. Id.
46. 5AJ. MOORE &J. LUCAS, supra note 4, 52.01[6], [7].
47. For a discussion of the interpretations by the courts of appeals, see infra
notes 74-167 and accompanying text.
48. 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
49. Id. at 366-67. The complaint charged the defendants with 1) conspiring
to fix prices on patented gypsum board and unpatented gypsum products,
2) regulating the distribution of gypsum board, and 3) standardizing gypsum
board to eliminate competition. Id. at 367.
50. Id. at 372. The Court noted that the documentary exhibits "present a
full picture . . . and are chiefly relied on by the government to prove its case."
Id.
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In reviewing the lower court's findings of fact, the Supreme Court stated
that rule 52(a) was applicable to findings and inferences drawn from
documents and undisputed facts. 52 The Court explained that "[a] find-
ing is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it,
the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite andfirm
conviction that a mistake has been committed."'5 s The Court also stated, how-
ever, that the rule intended "to make applicable the then prevailing eq-
uity procedure." 54 Notwithstanding this ambiguity, the Supreme Court
held that the findings of fact were clearly erroneous and reversed the
lower court.5 5
In Commissioner v. Duberstein,56 the Court reiterated the main thrust
of the Gypsum holding, ruling that "[w]here the trial has been by ajudge
without a jury, the judge's findings must stand unless 'clearly
erroneous.' "57
Six years later, in United States v. General Motors Corp. ,58 the Court, in
a footnote, distinguished "paper cases" from those based on oral evi-
dence, stating that the rationale behind rule 52(a) was to defer to "the
trial court's customary opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and thus
51. Id. at 367. The trial court noted that the government failed to establish
its case by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 388. The court found that
the evidence failed to establish a conspiracy to blanket the industry under patent
licenses or to control prices. Id. at 393.
52. Id. at 394. The Court stated that "[iun so far as this finding and others
to which we shall refer are inferences drawn from documents or undisputed
facts. . . . Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable." Id.
53. Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 395-96. In recounting the practice in equity, the Court stated that
"the findings of the trial court, when dependent upon oral testimony where the candor
and credibility of the witnesses would best be judged, had great weight with the
appellate court. The findings were never conclusive, however." Id. at 395 (em-
phasis added). The Supreme Court did not mention the equity practice gov-
erning findings dependent upon documentary evidence. For a discussion of
equity practice when findings were based on documentary evidence, see supra
notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
55. Id. at 396-99.
56. 363 U.S. 278 (1960). In Duberstein, the government sought to establish
a new test for determining whether a transfer was a "gift" under the Internal
Revenue Code. Id. at 284. The Court rejected any type of test, holding that the
question of a "gift" depends on a variety of factors, particularly the intent of the
parties, which should be decided "on the application of the factfinding tribunal's
experience with the mainsprings of human conduct to the totality of the facts of
each case." Id. at 289.
57. Id. at 291 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948) ("A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evi-
dence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.")).
58. 384 U.S. 127 (1966). The suit was brought by the government for al-
leged Sherman Act violations. Id. at 129. The Supreme Court reversed the
lower court, which had'held that the defendants violated the Sherman Act by
conspiring to restrain trade. Id. at 141-42.
238 [Vol. 30: p. 227
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the credibility of the witnesses .... .. 59 The Court noted that rule
52(a) "plays only a restricted role [in a paper case]." '60 These state-
ments, however, were purely dicta because the Court held that the dis-
trict court's finding was not a question of fact but rather a question of
law; therefore, the Court concluded that rule 52(a) did not apply.6 1
More recently, the Supreme Court has had two opportunities to dis-
cuss rule 52(a). 6 2 In Pullman-Standard v. Swint,63 employees brought a
title VII action against their employer, alleging that the employer prac-
ticed racial discrimination in the management of the company's seniority
system. 64 The district court found no intent to discriminate, 6 5 but the
Fifth Circuit, after reviewing the exhibits upon which the district court
reached its conclusion, reversed. 66 On appeal, the Supreme Court held
that the question of intent to discriminate was "a pure question of fact,
subject to Rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous standard." 67 In addition, the
59. Id. at 141 n.16.
60. Id. Of thirty-eight witnesses, only three testified in person. Id. The rest
of the witnesses testified by deposition, by affidavit, or by form of an agreed-
upon narrative of testimony. Id.
61. Id. The Court, however, further noted that it was not contradicting the
trial court's findings of fact, but supplementing the findings to assist "in deter-
mining whether they support the court's ultimate legal conclusion that there was
no conspiracy." Id.
62. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 104 S. Ct.
1949 (1984); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
63. 456 U.S. 273 (1982).
64. Id. at 275. While a prima facie title VII violation generally can be estab-
lished solely by practices with disparate effects against a particular race, prima
facie violations in seniority systems also require a showing of intent to discrimi-
nate. Id. at 276.
65. Id. at 275. In reaching its decision, the district court focused on four
factual determinations: (1) whether the system discouraged all employees from
transferring; (2) whether the departmental structure of the seniority system was
rational in light of general industry practice; (3) whether there was a relationship
between the seniority system and other racially discriminatory practices; and
(4) whether the system had been maintained free from any illegal purpose. Id. at
279-81. The district court found: (1) the system was racially neutral; (2) the
basic arrangements of the departments were rationally related to the work;
(3) the seniority system was not related to past discriminatory practices by the
employer and the union; and (4) the system was "untainted by any discrimina-
tory purpose." Id. at 279-81.
66. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 529 (5th Cir. 1980). On re-
view, the Fifth Circuit examined each issue before the district court, reached the
opposite conclusions, and reversed. Id. at 528-36. According to the Fifth Cir-
cuit: "An analysis of the totality of the facts and circumstances . . . leaves us
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. at 533.
The court also referred to the clearly erroneous standard in a footnote; however,
it quoted a prior decision which held that because discrimination was the ulti-
mate issue, the reviewing court "will proceed to make an independent determination
of [the employees'] allegations of discrimination, though bound by the findings
of subsidiary fact which are themselves not clearly erroneous." Id. n.6 (quoting
East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 1975)).
67. 456 U.S. at 287-88.
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Supreme Court stated: "Rule 52(a) broadly requires that findings of fact
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. It does not make exceptions
or purport to exclude certain categories of factual findings from the ob-
ligation of a court of appeals to accept a district court's findings unless
clearly erroneous." 68 The Court reversed the Fifth Circuit's ruling for
failure to apply the clearly erroneous standard. 69
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. ,70 the Court con-
sidered whether rule 52(a) governed review of a district court's finding
of actual malice in a defamation suit. Initially, the Court noted that rule
52(a) mandates that a trial judge's findings of fact be presumed cor-
rect.7 1 The Court also found that the "presumption of correctness that
attaches to factual findings is stronger in some cases than in others." 7 2
Specifically, the court ruled that while the "same 'clearly erroneous'
standard applies to findings based on documentary evidence as those
based entirely on oral testimony, . . . the presumption has lesser force
in the former situation than in the latter."7 3
68. Id. at 287. The Court rejected dividing "findings of fact into those that
deal with 'ultimate' and those that deal with 'subsidiary' facts." Id. Review of a
so called "ultimate" finding of fact which is a pure question of fact, as was intent
to discriminate, is constrained by the clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 286-87.
The Court indicated that review of so called mixed questions of law and fact,
which involve the application of legal standards, is not subject to the limits of
rule 52(a). Id. at 287-88.
69. Id. at 293. The Court reasoned that the Fifth Circuit failed to apply the
clearly erroneous standard because 1) acknowledgement of rule 52(a) by the
Fifth Circuit came late in the opinion, after it had disagreed with the district
court's findings; and 2) instead of remanding, the Fifth Circuit reversed, which
indicated that it made its own determinations concerning intent. Id. at 290-92.
Only Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, referred to the fact that the
district court's findings were entirely based on documentary evidence. Id. at 301
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing whether a remand was appropriate). Justice
Marshall found that the usual deference for the district court's findings of fact
was not required since the findings were entirely based on documentary evi-
dence. Id.
70. 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984). In Bose, the Court held that de novo appellate
review on the issue of actual malice in a defamation action was a requirement of
federal constitutional law. Id. at 1965. The Court asserted that independent
review was necessary "in order to preserve the precious liberties established and
ordained by the Constitution." Id. at 1965.
71. Id. at 1959 (quoting Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395) ("finding is 'clearly erro-
neous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the
entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed") (emphasis added by the Bose Court).
72. Id. The Court based this proposition on the requirement that special
deference be given to a trial judge's credibility determinations. Id.
73. Id. The Court noted that the presumption tends to increase with the
length of the trial since "trial judges have lived with the controversy for weeks or
months instead of just a few hours." Id.
The Court also stated that while the clearly erroneous standard has varying
degrees, the difference between independent (de novo) review and the clearly er-
roneous standard is "much more than a mere matter of degree." Id. In discuss-
ing the impact of independent review, the Court commented that "independent
240 [Vol. 30: p. 227
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B. Circuit Court Interpretations
Notwithstanding the several statements by the Supreme Court, the
circuit courts of appeals have continued to apply different standards of
review to a trial judge's findings of fact based upon documentary evi-
dence.74 The three standards of review used by the appellate courts are
the following:
1) The "clearly erroneous" standard of review, whereby all
findings of fact by a judge are presumptively correct whether
the evidence is oral or documentary;
75
2) De novo review, whereby the appellate court is free to re-
view the entire record and make its own findings of fact when
evidence is documentary;
76
3) The "modified clearly erroneous" standard of review,
whereby less deference is given to findings of fact based on
documentary evidence than is given to oral evidence under the
clearly erroneous standard.
7 7
review assigns to judges a constitutional responsibility that cannot be delegated
to the trier of fact." Id. The Court asserted that the constitutional values in the
first amendment require independent review. Id. at 1960.
74. See Burlington N. Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 719 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir.
1983) ("clearly erroneous standard of review applies to findings of fact even
when the district court relies solely on a written record"); Onaway Transp. Co.
v. Offshore Tugs, Inc., 695 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1983) (while the clearly erro-
neous standard applies, "the degree of deference to be accorded a district
court's findings of fact is lower when the case is submitted wholly on documents
...."); In re Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 540 F.2d 601, 603 (3d
Cir. 1976) ("Since we are in just as good a position as the district court to evalu-
ate documentary evidence, we have undertaken an independent and comprehen-
sive review of this evidence.").
75. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. at 395 ("A
finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm convic-
tion that a mistake has been committed."); Constructura Maza, Inc. v. Banco de
Ponce, 616 F.2d 573, 576 (lst Cir. 1980) ("The presumption of correctness re-
flected in the 'clearly erroneous' rule applies not only when the district court's
findings are based upon its assessment of conflicting testimony, but also when,
as here, much of the evidence is documentary. ... ); Case v. Morrisette, 475
F.2d 1300, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[W]e must also measure the findings by the
'clearly erroneous' test even when they are based on inferences drawn from the
documents or undisputed facts.").
76. See Taylor v. Lombard, 606 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir. 1979) ("Since the
district court findings were based solely on a review of the state court record, we
are not bound by the 'clearly erroneous' standard of review under Rule 52(a),
Fed. R. Civ. P., but may make our own independent factual determination."); In
re Multidistrict Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 540 F.2d 601, 603 (3d Cir. 1976)
("Since we are in just as good a position as the district court to evaluate docu-
mentary evidence, we have undertaken an independent and comprehensive re-
view of this evidence.").
77. See Bose Corp., 104 S. Ct. at 1959 ("The same 'clearly erroneous' stan-
dard applies to findings based on documentary evidence. . . ,but the presump-
tion has lesser force .... "); Marcum v. United States, 621 F.2d 142, 145 (5th
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1. Clearly Erroneous Standard
Courts in the First,78 Fourth,7 9 Sixth, 80 Eighth,8 1 Eleventh, 8 2 and
the District of Columbia83 Circuits presently adhere to the principle that
all findings of fact are only reviewable under the clearly erroneous stan-
dard, regardless of whether the evidence is documentary or oral.
In Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce,84 the First Circuit re-
Cir. 1980) ("[W]here the evidence before the trial court consisted solely of dep-
ositions and other written matter, . . . the burden of showing clear error is not
so heavy as in the case where the court has the opportunity to assess the credibil-
ity of witnesses by personal observation."); Green v. Russell County, 603 F.2d
571, 573-74 (5th Cir. 1979) ("Although . . . the burden of establishing clear
error is not so heavy as in the normal case, our review of the factual findings is
nevertheless governed by the clearly erroneous standard.").
78. See Constructora Maza, Inc. v. Banco de Ponce, 616 F.2d 573 (1st Cir.
1980) (court applied the clearly erroneous standard when much of the evidence
was documentary).
79. See Marino Sys., Inc. v.J. Cowhey & Sons, Inc., 631 F.2d 313 (4th Cir.
1980) (court rejected application of full appellate review to question of infringe-
ment of a patent based wholly on documentary evidence and a comparison of
the structures of certain devices); Nalle v. First Nat'l Bank, 412 F.2d 881 (4th
Cir. 1969) (findings only reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard even
though most of the evidence was documentary).
80. In the Sixth Circuit, there is a conflict among decisions over the appro-
priate standard of review of findings of fact based on documentary evidence.
Compare United States v.Jabara, 644 F.2d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying the
clearly erroneous standard in a criminal case where there was no oral testimony)
and Ingram Corp. v. Ohio River Co., 505 F.2d 1364, 1369 (6th Cir. 1974) (in
admiralty case, court adhered to rule that "the clearly erroneous rule should
control even where the entire record consisted of depositions, Coast Guard
records, and other written material") and United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman,
407 F.2d 1143, 1146 (6th Cir. 1969) ("We conclude that Rule 52(a) applies to
the findings of fact of the DistrictJudge in the present case notwithstanding that
he heard no live testimony at the trial.") with Lydle v. United States, 635 F.2d
763, 765 n.1 (6th Cir. 1981) (court acknowledged in dicta the disagreement
within the circuit over the standard of review and noted that "where the trier of
fact has observed no witnesses, the 'clearly erroneous' test is inapplicable;" the
court "is in as good a position as the district court to review a purely documen-
tary record and to arrive at conclusions of mixed law and fact") and In re Clem-
ens, 472 F.2d 939, 941 n.l (6th Cir. 1972) ("This is, in substance, a 'paper case,'
and the clearly erroneous test of Rule 52(a) . . . is inapplicable.").
81. Hoefelman v. Conservation Comm'n., 718 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1983)
(factual determinations based upon conflicting depositions are only reviewable
under the clearly erroneous standard).
82. Dothan Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 745 F.2d 1400 (11 th
Cir. 1984) (clearly erroneous standard applied to findings of fact based upon
documents and transcripts of evidence presented in an earlier action). For fur-
ther discussion of Dothan, see supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
83. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (apply-
ing the clearly erroneous standard to a finding that certain documents were pro-
tected by a work product privilege); Case v. Morrisette, 475 F.2d 1300, 1307
(D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[W]e must also measure the findings by the 'clearly errone-
ous' test even when they are based on inferences drawn from documents or un-
disputed facts.").
84. 616 F.2d 573 (lst Cir. 1980).
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viewed findings of fact based almost entirely on documentary evi-
dence.8 5 The district court, sitting by designation in a bankruptcy
proceeding, held that certain transfers by plaintiff to defendant were
voidable preferences. 86 The First Circuit reviewed two elements of a
voidable preference: whether plaintiff was insolvent at the time of trans-
fer and whether the defendant had reasonable cause to believe plaintiff
was insolvent.8 7 After determining that both of these elements were
questions of fact, the First Circuit held that the clearly erroneous stan-
dard applied "when, as here, much of the evidence is documentary and
the challenged findings are factual inferences drawn from undisputed
facts." 88 Furthermore, the court recognized that because the question
of whether defendant had reasonable cause to believe plaintiff was insol-
vent was a highly fact-sensitive question, its role was only to determine
"whether there is sufficient basis in fact for the district court's find-
ings." 89 The court concluded that the district court's findings of fact
were not clearly erroneous. 90
Similarly, in Hoefelman v. Conservation Commission,9 t the Eighth Cir-
cuit also concluded that the clearly erroneous standard of rule 52(a)
governed appellate review of factfindings based on documentary evi-
dence. In Hoefelman, the district court had found that age was a bona
fide occupational qualification for pilots; therefore, it concluded that the
defendant had not violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) when it prohibited plaintiff from flying.92 Based upon conflict-
ing depositions of two experts, the district court determined that there
was no other way to discover whether a pilot was able to fly safely except
by reference to age.93 In reviewing this finding of fact, the Eighth Circuit
relied upon the Supreme Court decision in Pullman-Standard v. Swint to
hold that a trial judge's factual determinations based on conflicting dep-
85. Id. at 576. The court did not indicate the exact type of evidence
presented in the case.
86. Id. at 575.
87. Id. The court noted that several circuits characterize these elements as
mixed questions of law and fact; however, it relied on an earlier Supreme Court
decision to characterize the question as a factual one. Id. at 576 n.2 (citing Kauf-
man v. Tredway, 195 U.S. 271 (1904)).
88. Id. (citing Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960)).
89. Id. at 578. The First Circuit commented that its "task [was] not to make
this factual determination de novo ...... Id.
90. Id. at 577-79.
91. 718 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1983).
92. Id. at 282-83. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1982). The defendant instituted a policy of prohibiting pilots from
flying its aircraft when they reached sixty. 718 F.2d at 282. As a result, the
plaintiff, who was sixty, was transferred to a position of equal grade, salary, and
benefits, though he no longer flew. Id.
93. Id. at 283. The district court found that aging detrimentally affected a
person's psychomotor functions, which are important to pilots. Id.
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ositions should "not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. ' 9 4
The court commented that the Pullman decision "laid to rest" most of
the uncertainty among the circuits as to the appropriate standard of re-
view where evidence is documentary, 9 5 and that "[i]t is the particular
province of the district court to find facts." '96 After reviewing the rec-
ord, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the findings of the district court
were not clearly erroneous. 97
Recently, in Burlington Northern, Inc. v. Weyerhaeuser Co. ,98 the Ninth
Circuit held that the clearly erroneous standard applied to review of
findings of fact based on documentary evidence. 99 In Burlington, the
court considered whether a shipment of logs was transported in inter-
state or intrastate commerce.10 0 After examining the depositions and
pretrial materials, the district court held that the shipments were intra-
state in nature.' 0 ' On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, appellant contended
that the court should apply a "more careful scrutiny" to the district
court's finding of fact because the district court relied solely on a written
record. 10 2 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that even
where the district court relied completely on a written record, the clearly
erroneous standard governed its review of findings of fact.' 0 3 Examin-
ing the record, the court found substantial evidence to support the dis-
trict court's findings of fact and affirmed. 10 4
94. Id. at 285 (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 284 n.14
(1982)). The Eighth Circuit determined that in Pullman, "[t]he Supreme Court
made clear that Rule 52 applies to all findings of fact of the district court." Id. at
284.
95. Id. (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982)). The court
noted seemingly contradictory positions within the Eighth Circuit. Id. at 284 n.3
(citing for comparison Swanson v. Baker Indus., 615 F.2d 479, 483 (8th Cir.
1980) (although under applicable state law the construction of a contract was a
question of law, court stated that "[w]here the construction of a contract rests
upon documentation and factual findings . . . . we review the district court's
construction free of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)"); Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Frank-
lin Life Ins. Co., 370 F.2d 97, 99-100 (8th Cir. 1966) (even when a case was
submitted upon pleadings, answers and exhibits, the reviewing court could not
try the case de novo)).
96. Id. at 285 (citing Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136,
138 (8th Cir. 1950).
97. Id. at 286.
98. 719 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1983).
99. Id. at 307.
100. Id. Plaintiff, a railroad company, asserted that the shipments by the
defendant were intended for out-of-state locations, and that for this reason, in-
terstate tariff rates applied. Id.
101. Id. at 306. The trial judge, focusing on the retention of control by the
defendant over the loss during shipment, held that the defendant did not have
the requisite specific intent to ship the logs out of state. Id.
102. Id. at 307.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 307-10. The Ninth Circuit had previously reviewed a district
court's findings of fact based on documentary evidence in a habeas corpus case
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NOTES
In reaching its decision in Burlington, the Ninth Circuit relied upon
its previous decision in Lundgren v. Freeman.10 5 In Lundgren, Judge
Duniway, speaking for the majority, stated that rule 52(a) "should be
construed to encourage appeals that are based on a conviction that the
trial court's decision has been unjust; it should not be construed to en-
courage appeals that are based on the hope that the appellate court will
second-guess the trial court."' 0 6 Judge Duniway asserted that rule 52(a)
was designed to enable an appellate judge to determine whether justice
was done, not to decide issues of fact in the first instance. 10 7 The Ninth
Circuit, therefore, held that the clearly erroneous standard applied. 10 8
Several commentators also adhere to the view that the clearly erro-
neous standard embodied in rule 52(a) is applicable to review of find-
ings of fact based on documentary evidence.' 0 9 First, they contend that
disregard of the trial court's findings by appellate courts imperils the
confidence of litigants and the public in the decisions of the district
court. 1 10 Second, they suggest that the number of appeals, with con-
under the clearly erroneous standard. See Maxwell v. Sumner, 673 F.2d 1031,
1036 (9th Cir. 1982). The court held that the findings that petitioner "engaged
in no outlandish behavior . . . are based on 'the fact finding tribunal's experi-
ence with the mainspring of human conduct,'. . . and on its experience in con-
ducting trials and observing defendants' behavior." Id. at 1036 (quoting
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960)). The Ninth Circuit re-
jected the de novo standard of review as applied in other circuits. Id. at 1036 n.5.
105. 307 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1962).
106. Id. at 114. The court stated that "[t]he purpose of 'appeal' in equity
cases was to enable a higher court to search the record to see if justice was
done." Id.
107. Id. Additionally, Judge Duniway reasoned that one of the main pur-
poses of findings of fact-giving the appellate court an understanding of the trial
court's decision-would be rendered moot by de novo review. Id.
108. Id. at 115. The court relied on Duberstein as suggesting that the clearly
erroneous standard applied to review of findings of fact based on undisputed
facts. Id. For a discussion of Duberstein, see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying
text.
Having reached this conclusion, the Lundgren court reconciled its holding
with prior decisions in the circuit that had reached the opposite result. The
court reasoned that cases which had held that no weight need be given to a trial
court's findings of fact appeared to be cases in which the court reviewed infer-
ences drawn from an application of a legal standard, not cases which involved
pure findings of fact. 307 F.2d at 115. The court distinguished a finding of fact
as "a finding based upon the 'fact-finding tribunal's experience with the main-
springs of human conduct.' " Id. A trial court's conclusion of law, to which a
reviewing court need not give any weight, is one based on the application of a
legal standard. Id.
109. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 43, § 2587; Chesnut, supra note
37, at 540-41, 572; Clark, supra note 4, at 505-06; Clark & Stone, supra note 11,
at 215-17; Wright, supra note 4, at 764-71; Note, supra note 4.
110. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 43, § 2587, at 748. The authors
assert that even where the appellate court is in as good a position as the trial
court, "it should not disregard the trial court's finding, for to do so impairs con-
fidence in the trial courts ....... Id. The authors quote an Eighth Circuit deci-
sion which recognized that any doubt over whether the district court decides fact
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comitant expense and delay, would multiply with de novo review."' l
Third, they argue that deference should be given to the trial judge."t 2
Finally, they contend that the clearly erroneous standard promotes uni-
formity and thereby fulfills the intent of the Advisory Committee.' ' 3
2. De Novo Review
In reviewing findings of fact based on documentary evidence, the
Second and Third Circuits have consistently applied a de novo standard
of review.11 4 The leading case supporting the application of the de novo
review to findings of fact based on documentary evidence is Orvis v. Hig-
questions will be "detrimental to the orderly administration ofjustice, [and] im-
pair[s] the confidence of litigants and the public in the decisions of the district
courts ...... Id. (quoting Pendergrass v. New York Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136,
138 (8th Cir. 1950)). See also Wright, supra note 4, at 781 ("I doubt whether
there will be much satisfaction with the judgments of trial courts among a public
which is educated to believe that only appellate judges are trustworthy ministers
of justice.").
111. See Clark & Stone, supra note 11, at 217 (right of appeal should be
restricted to protect appellate courts from "a plethora of cases" and to reduce,
not increase, records); Wright, supra note 4, at 780 ("It is literally marvelous
that, at a time when the entire profession is seeking ways to minimize congestion
and delay in the courts, we should set on a course [de novo review] which inevita-
bly must increase congestion and delay.").
112. Chesnut, supra note 37, at 540 ("Surely the findings of fact by a judge
ought to have no less weight than the findings of a jury, especially as the parties
have by preference stipulated that he shall make the findings."); Wright, supra
note 4, at 781 ("If trial judges are carefully selected, as in the federal system, it is
hard to think of any reason why they are more likely to make errors ofjudgment
than are appellate judges.").
113. See Clark, supra note 4, at 506. Judge Clark, reporter to the Advisory
Committee, sought a balance between an individual's rights and a workable pro-
cedure for review; however, appellate courts which apply de novo review empha-
size only preservation of rights, and thus apply an unduly rigid interpretation of
the rule. Id. The result is a "rule now so overturned that when the appellate
court wishes to apply the policy of nonreviewability of the original rule, it finds it
necessary to utter an apology for seeming to violate the rule of the case law." Id.
See also Wright, supra note 4, at 770 ("That Rule 52 required application of the
'clearly erroneous' test to all findings, regardless of the nature of the evidence,
should thus have been apparent to anyone who understands the difference be-
tween a hypothetical and a conjunctive proposition."); Note, supra note 4, at
532-33 ("this interpretation [clearly erroneous standard for review of all find-
ings of fact] has the virtue of promoting uniformity, a primary objective of the
drafters").
114. See Taylor v. Lombard, 606 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1979); In re Multidistrict
Litig. Involving Frost Patent, 540 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1976).
In the past, the Eighth Circuit had supported the application of de novo re-
view to findings of fact based on documentary evidence. See Swanson v. Baker
Indus., 615 F.2d 479, 483 (8th Cir. 1980) (construction of a contract which rests
upon documentation and factual findings can be reviewed free of the clearly er-
roneous standard). More recently, however, the Eighth Circuit interpreted Pull-
man-Standard v. Swint as requiring application of the clearly erroneous standard
to all findings of fact. See Hoefelman v. Conservation Comm'n, 718 F.2d 281
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20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [1985], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss1/5
gins, 115 a Second Circuit decision written by Judge Frank. 1 16 In Orris,
decedent's estate was assessed an estate tax on the corpus of decedent
wife's trust. 1 7 Plaintiff, executor of decedent's estate, sued defendant,
collector for the Internal Revenue Service, for a refund of that portion
of the estate tax allocable to the trust. Defendant defended the collec-
tion of taxes on the ground that reciprocal trusts had been created by
decedent and his wife." 8 The district court found that the settlors of
the trusts did not intend them to be reciprocal." II Before reviewing the
findings of fact in the case, Judge Frank made the following statements
with respect to the standards of review applicable to findings of fact
made by a district judge in a nonjury trial:
a) If he decides a fact issue on written evidence alone, we are as
able as he to determine credibility, and so we may disregard his
finding.
b) Where the evidence is partly oral and the balance is written
or deals with undisputed facts, then we may ignore the trial
judge's finding and substitute our own, (1) if the written evi-
dence or some undisputed fact renders the credibility of the
oral testimony extremely doubtful, or (2) if the trial judge's
finding must rest exclusively on the written evidence or the un-
disputed facts, so that his evaluation of credibility has no
significance.
c) But where the evidence supporting his finding as to any fact
issue is entirely oral testimony, we may disturb that finding only
in the most unusual circumstances. 120
(8th Cir. 1983). For a discussion of Hoefelman, see supra notes 91-97 and accom-
panying text.
For a discussion of the arguments in favor of de novo review, see generally J.
MOORE & J. LuCAS, supra note 4, V 52.04.
115. 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950).
116. Id. at 538. Judge Frank was considered the leading advocate of de novo
review, which several commentators have labeled as the "Frank" position. See,
e.g., C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 43, § 2587, at 749; Note, supra note 4, at
520-24.
117. 180 F.2d at 537.
118. Id. If the trusts were reciprocal, then they would be treated as though
the decedent were settlor for his wife's trust, and he would retain life income.
Id. at 541.
119. Id. at 540. The Second Circuit commented that the trial judge "relied
on no positive testimony . . . but relied merely on negative testimony as to the
absence of an expressed intention to act reciprocally ....... Id.
120. Id. at 539-40. In establishing these categories, the court expressed re-
liance upon Gypsum and federal equity practice. Id. at 539 (citing Gypsum, 333
U.S. at 384-96). The court focused upon an assertion in Gypsum that where testi-
mony is in conflict with documents, the testimony carries little weight. Id. (citing
Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 394-96). Before and after Orvis, Gypsum was cited almost
exclusively in support of the clearly erroneous standard of review. See Note,
supra note 4, at 521.
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In Orvis, while the evidence was in the form of oral testimony, Judge
Frank asserted that the trial judge's evaluations of credibility were unim-
portant, and drew an opposite inference than that of the trial court,
while assuring that the testimony which the court relied upon was com-
pletely credible.' 2 1 While the court stated that on an issue relating to
intent, the appellate court was in as good a position to evaluate the testi-
mony as the trial judge, 12 2 the court ultimately held that the trial judge's
findings were "clearly erroneous." 12 3 It is difficult to ascertain the ac-
tual standard of review used by the Orvis court due to this ambiguity in
its analysis.
More recently, the Second Circuit applied de novo review in Taylor v.
Lombard.124 In Taylor, petitioner was found guilty of assault in state
court. Subsequently, he unsuccessfully moved to dismiss on the ground
that several prosecution witnesses had perjured themselves with the
knowing acquiescence of the prosecutor. 125 Petitioner filed a petition
for writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied. 12 6 On appeal,
the Second Circuit decided that it could make its own factual determina-
tion concerning whether the prosecutor knowingly acquiesced to per-
jured testimony, free of the clearly erroneous standard, "[s]ince the
district court findings were based solely on a review of the state court
record .... .127 The Second Circuit reversed, finding that the prose-
121. Id. at 540-41. The court decided that since the evidence consisted
mostly of undisputed testimony, the trial court's credibility determinations were
not critical to its findings of fact. Id. at 540.
122. Id. at 541. The court conditioned this assertion on the assumption
that the witnesses spoke the truth. Id. Although the Eighth Circuit constantly
reiterated that the witnesses spoke the truth, the court nevertheless disregarded
witnesses' testimony that either party acted with the other party's intention in
mind. Id. at 540.
123. Id. The Court stated that "the undisputed facts are such that we have a
'definite and firm conviction' that the trial judge was mistaken .... " Id. In
dissent, Judge Chase believed that the trial judge's findings of fact were not
clearly erroneous, commenting that "[t]his is a typical instance for the applica-
tion of Civil Rule 52(a). Though trial judges may at times be mistaken as to
facts, appellate judges are not always omniscient." Id. at 542 (Chase, J.,
dissenting).
124. 606 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin
Piano & Organ, 604 F.2d 755, 758 (2d Cir. 1979) (without referring to rule
52(a), court held that where a preliminary injunction was granted on a "paper
record," the appellate court had the power of full review).
125. 606 F.2d at 372. The key to the trial was the credibility of the peti-
tioner and his story versus the prosecutor's witnesses. Id. at 374. The alleged
perjurers included the assaulted person and his wife. Id. at 375. Petitioners'
evidence of perjury consisted of a third party affidavit and testimony at a post-
trial hearing that the victim's wife had informed the prosecutor of certain facts
prior to trial, which contradicted her testimony at trial. Id. at 374.
126. Id. at 372. The district court judge found that petitioner's claims had
no factual basis and dismissed the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id.
127. Id. at 372. The court, however, posited another reason which allowed
de novo review:' "Where we are confronted with a claimed error of constitutional
magnitude we must review the record to make our own determination .... "
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cutor knowingly acquiesced to perjury, and that disclosure of the per-
jured testimony at trial could have resulted in a different verdict.' 28
The Third Circuit has consistently applied de novo review to findings
of fact based on documentary evidence. 129 In Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Gereau, 130 defendants were convicted of first degree murder, at
which time they moved for a new trial. 13 1 The trial judge reviewed de
novo the record compiled at a posttrial hearing before a master and de-
nied defendants' motion for a new trial.' 32 On appeal, defendants as-
serted that the trial judge's findings of fact were unsupported by the
evidence of record. 13 3 In selecting the proper standard of review, the
Third Circuit distinguished between cases tried solely on the basis of
documentary evidence where the facts in the documents were stipulated
and where the facts were disputed. 134 The Third Circuit affirmed all but
Id. at 375. The court stated that "[i]t is well established that a prosecutor's
knowing use of perjured testimony violates the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." Id. at 374.
128. Id. at 372. The court held that disclosure of the truth by the prosecu-
tion's witnesses during the trial could have influenced the jury's assessment of
credibility and would have tended to corroborate petitioner's contentions. Id. at
375.
129. See Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 27 E.P.D. 32,148 (3d Cir.
1981) ("We have thus consistently held for at least the past quarter century...
that the Rule 52(a) 'clearly erroneous' standard does not apply to wholly docu-
mentary cases where the record discloses no oral testimony."), vacated on other
grounds, 688 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1014 (1983).
Recently, some members of the Third Circuit have questioned the validity
of the line of cases supporting de novo review in light of the Supreme Court
decision in Pullman. See Bittner v. Borne Chemical Co., 691 F.2d 134 (3d Cir.
1982). In Bittner, petitioners in a bankruptcy action contended that the bank-
ruptcy court based its valuation of claims on incorrect findings of fact. Id. at
138. Writing for the majority, Judge Gibbons commented that although the
bankruptcy findings were based on undisputed documentations or stipulated ev-
idence, the Pullman decision suggested that "[o]nly when the trial court's factual
findings are clearly erroneous should an appellate court intervene." Id. Never-
theless, the court stated that "even treating the matter originally, we would draw
the same inferences .... " Id. In dicta, however, the Bittner court indicated that
the practice within the Third Circuit of applying de novo review may be ending as
a result of Pullman. Id.
130. 523 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 917 (1976).
131. Id. at 142. Defendants' motion requesting a new trial was based on the
ground that all the jurors had not freely assented to the verdict. This motion
was supported by affidavits of two jurors; however, the trial judge found that the
affidavits were made out of fear. Id. at 142-43. The chief judge of the district
subsequently ordered a posttrial hearing to inquire into allegations that the jury
was tampered with during deliberations. Id. at 143.
132. Id. at 143-44.
133. Id. at 144. Defendants also asserted that the government had the bur-
den of proving that none of the alleged incidents were prejudicial, and that this
burden was not sustained. Id. The court assumed that the government had the
burden but concluded that the burden was met. Id. at 154.
134. Id. at 144. The court stated that if the facts were agreed to, then it
could, within limits, substitute its own factual conclusions. Id. (citing Demirjian
v. Commissioner, 457 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1972). However, if the facts were in
1985] NOTES 249
23
Robins: Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary Evidence: Is the
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
two findings on the ground that it was "in as good a position to deter-
mine the question as [was] the district court."' 135 The court noted that
all the findings which it affirmed had "adequate and reasonable support
in the record."' 3 6 As a result, the court affirmed the denial of motion
for a new trial.1
3 7
Shortly after its decision in Gereau, the Third Circuit again applied
de novo review in In Re Multidistrict Litigation Involving Frost Patent.138 In
Frost Patent, the district court found that the defendant had proved fraud
on the patent office by clear, unequivocal and convincing proof as was
required and therefore held the Frost patent invalid. 139 The defendant
met this demanding burden of proof by relying primarily upon uncon-
tested documents.' 40 Focusing on its ability to evaluate documentary
evidence as well as the district court, the Third Circuit undertook an
"independent and comprehensive review of this evidence,"' 4 1 and up-
held the district court's finding of fraud. 14 2
3. Modified Clearly Erroneous Standard
While adhering to the clearly erroneous standard, the Fifth, Sev-
enth and Tenth Circuits have held that the burden of establishing clear
error is not as heavy when the evidence is entirely documentary as when
the evidence includes oral testimony. 14 3 Under this modified standard
of review, courts, while still constrained by the clearly erroneous stan-
dard, can undertake a more in-depth review and more readily find the
dispute and not material, then the clearly erroneous standard of review applied.
Id. at 144-45 & n.12 (citing United States v. United Steelworkers, 271 F.2d 676,
685, 688 (3d Cir.), afd, 361 U.S. 39 (1959)).
135. Id. at 145-46 (quoting Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d
904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975)). The court found the case to be distinguishable from
both Demijian and Steelworkers. Id. at 145 & n.12. Although the court spoke of
the "as good a position" reviewing standard rather than de novo review, the prac-
tical outcome-an independent determination by the reviewing court-was the
same. Id. at 145-46.
136. Id. at 146 n.14.
137. Id. at 155.
138. 540 F.2d 601 (3d Cir. 1976).
139. Id. at 603.
140. Id. The district court held that the reliance on uncontested documents
by itself met the burden of clear and convincing proof. Id. The Third Circuit
held that this reliance, in and of itself, was insufficient to establish clear and
convincing proof. Id.
141. Id. The court reasoned that independent review was justified, "since
we are in just as good a position as the district court to evaluate documentary
evidence ...... Id.
142. Id. While affirming the finding of fraud, the court held the Frost patent
to be invalid only in part. Id. at 611.
143. See, e.g., Onaway Transp. Co. v. Offshore Tugs, Inc., 695 F.2d 197 (5th
Cir. 1983); Jennihgs v. General Medical Corp., 604 F.2d 1300 (10th Cir. 1979);
Oscar Gruss & Son v. First State Bank, 582 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1978).
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trial court's findings of fact to be clearly erroneous. 1 44
In Onaway Transportation Co. v. Offshore Tugs, Inc. ,145 the Fifth Circuit
expressed its view on the applicable standard of review for a district
judge's findings of fact based on documentary evidence. In Onaway,
plaintiff brought suit alleging that defendant overcharged for towing
services. 146 The case was submitted to the district court solely on the
basis of deposition testimony and other documentary evidence. 14 7 Re-
viewing these documents, the district court held that plaintiff had agreed
to a higher price. 14 8 The court commented that while constrained by
the "clearly erroneous" standard of review, "the judge has not gained
the unique advantage in evaluating the evidence which normally comes
from observing the demeanor of witnesses appearing before the court"
when the case is submitted wholly on documentary evidence. 14 9 The
court stated, however, that while the degree of deference may be low-
ered, as other Fifth Circuit cases had held, 150 it was still restricted from
reversing the findings of fact unless "upon reviewing 'the entire evi-
dence' we are 'left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been committed.' 11151 The court concluded that such a mistake had
been committed by the district judge. 1 52
144. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 43, § 2587, at 741; Clark, supra
note 4, at 505-06; Wright, supra note 4, at 764-70; Note, supra note 4, at 519-20.
145. 695 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1983).
146. Id. at 198. Plaintiffs hired defendant's tugs to aid one of its ships that
was experiencing mechanical troubles and probably had run aground. Id. The
dispute concerned the price at which the plaintiff had agreed to employ defend-
ant's services. Id. On the day the ship was rescued, the parties entered into a
contract which specified a price that was normally charged for servicing ships
that are afloat. Id. On the following day, the parties engaged in conversation
which defendants alleged resulted in a second contract for the higher price that
is charged to rescue ships which are aground. The issue presented was whether
a binding contract had been made upon the initial lower price. Id. Defendants
argued that no contract had been formed because it did not know, at the time of
its making, that plaintiff's ship was aground. Id. at 199-200.
147. Id. at 199.
148. Id. The district court, on the basis of documentary evidence, made a
finding of fact that defendant was unaware that plaintiff's ship was aground until
the day after service was rendered, at which time the defendant claimed a higher
fee. Id. at 199-200.
149. Id. at 200. The court indicated that the degree of deference to a dis-
trict court's findings of fact is lower when the case is submitted wholly on docu-
ments. Id.
150. See, e.g., Green v. Russell County, 603 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1979). In
Green, the case was tried entirely on depositions, affidavits and documents. Id. at
573. The court indicated that while it was bound by the clearly erroneous stan-
dard, "the burden of establishing clear error is not so heavy as in the normal
case ....... Id. The court, however, did not state that it must have a "definite
and firm conviction" of error.
151. 695 F.2d at 200 (quoting McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20
(1954)).
152. Id. Upon reviewing defendant's daily boat logs, the court concluded
that defendant knew that plaintiff's ship was aground prior to rendering services.
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In Oscar Gruss & Son v. First State Bank, 153 the Seventh Circuit ap-
plied a modified form of the clearly erroneous standard. In Gruss, de-
fendant obtained treasury bills which the deliverer had stolen from
plaintiff.' 54 The issue in dispute was whether defendant was a bona fide
purchaser of the treasury bills, so as to afford it protection under the
Uniform Commercial Code.' 5 5 The district court found that defendant
was a bona fide purchaser and thus protected.' 56 On appeal, the Sev-
enth Circuit first held that the question of notice, which was integral to
the question of good faith, was a question of fact, not law.' 5 7 The court
then indicated that where, as in the present case, evidence is virtually
undisputed and the findings of fact are based on documentary evidence,
while the clearly erroneous standard applies, the "force of the rule may
be 'less inhibiting.' "158 The court concluded, however, that the district
court's findings of fact were entitled to some deference and could not be
set aside unless the "appellate court can 'come to a definite and firm
conviction that no error [was] committed in the findings .... . .
Contrary to the district court, the Seventh Circuit was "inclined to the
view that the defendant had notice;" it did not reverse the finding, how-
ever, because the court did not have a "definite and firm conviction"
that the district court had erred in making its findings. 160
The Tenth Circuit also seemed to deviate from the clearly errone-
Id. See also Marcum v. United States, 621 F.2d 142, 145 (5th Cir. 1980) (while
noting that the burden was lessened when evidence was documentary, a finding
is clearly erroneous where from "our view of the same evidence from the same
vantage point as the trial court leaves us 'with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed' ") (quoting Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395).
153. 582 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1978).
154. Id. at 427-28. The deliverer transferred the treasury bills to defendant
to pay off an unauthorized loan. Id. at 428. At the time the defendant redeemed
the bills, plaintiff had not reported them missing to any authorities. Id.
155. Id. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) defines a bona fide pur-
chaser as one who purchases for value in good faith and without notice of any
adverse claims upon delivery. U.C.C. § 8-302 (1978). Section 8-301 provides
that a bona fide purchaser acquires the security free of any adverse claims. Id.
§ 8-301.
156. 582 F.2d at 429.
157. Id. at 430. The court determined that the question of whether a party
acted without notice and with good faith "turned on the particular facts in-
volved." Id.
158. Id. at 431.
159. Id. (deletion by Gruss court) (quoting Mercantile Nat'l Bank of Chicago
v. Howmet, 524 F.2d 1031, 1035 n.3 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 957
(1976)).
160. Id. at 432. The reason that the Seventh Circuit did not find the trial
judge's findings of fact to be clearly erroneous was that no finding was made as
to whether defendant had constructive notice. Id. at 432-33. Thus, while the
trial judge's findings were insufficient, the findings were not necessarily errone-
ous. Id. The court did conclude that the burden of proof was improperly placed
on the plaintiff and remanded for two further findings: 1) whether the bank had
constructive notice; and 2) whether the trial judges placed the full burden on
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ous standard inJennings v. General Medical Corp. 161 The district court in
Jennings entered judgment for plaintiff in a breach of contract action, 162
having made findings of fact based upon its interpretation of the con-
tract and of various registration forms under the Securities Act of
1933.163 In reviewing the district court's findings, the Tenth Circuit
found that findings of fact based on documentary evidence carried less
weight than those based on oral evidence, reasoning that it was "equally
capable of examining documents, depositions and stipulations, and
drawing its own conclusions."' 16 4 The court, however, stated that it
would not substitute its judgment for that of the district court unless the
district court's findings were clearly erroneous. 16 5 Proceeding to ex-
amine the documentary evidence, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that
several interpretations of the contract were possible,16 6 but substituted
its determination for that of the district court. 167
plaintiff or only the burden after defendant's prima facie case was presented. Id.
at 433-34.
See also Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 706 F.2d 204, 206 (7th Cir. 1983)
(court constrained to give substantial deference to the district court's findings
under the clearly erroneous test even though the district court partially relied on
documentary evidence) (citing Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. 273 (1982)); Atari,
Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
In Atari, plaintiff sued defendant for copyright infringement and filed a motion
for a preliminary injunction. 672 F.2d at 610. The district court denied plain-
tiff's motion, concluding that plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of success in
the suit on the merits. Id. at 610. On review of the denial of the preliminary
injunction, the Seventh Circuit indicated that since the determination of copy-
right infringement was based on an "ocular comparison" of plaintiff's and de-
fendant's products and did not involve any credibility issues, the "court is in as
good a position as a district court to decide that question." Id. at 614. Despite
this language, which suggests application of a de novo standard of review, the
court found that the district court's conclusion that the two products were not
substantially similar was "clearly erroneous" and it reversed the denial of the
preliminary injunction. Id. at 620-21.
161. 604 F.2d 1300 (10th Cir. 1979).
162. Id. at 1301. Pursuant to an agreement, plaintiffs received restricted
stock in defendant corporation which could not be sold without a registration.
Id. at 1302. The agreement permitted the plaintiffs to participate in certain SEC
registrations if a public offering was made within three years. Id. The issue
presented was whether defendant had breached the agreement by failing to no-
tify the plaintiff of an impending secondary offering under Form S-16. Id. at
1304. The defendant contended that the contract did not require it to give no-
tice of an S-16 offering. Id. at 1304-05. Plaintiff argued that the S-16 was a
"successor" to forms covered in the agreement, and that the defendant was
therefore required to give notice. Id.
163. Id. at 1305. The court found that there was no issue of witness credi-
bility. Id.
164. Id. at 1305-06.
165. Id. at 1306.
166. Id. The court concluded that different interpretations were possible
when looking at one particular statement in the agreement, but when the provi-
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IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 52(A)
A. The Amendment and Its Purpose
On July 18, 1984, Walter R. Mansfield, Chairman of the Advisory
Committee of Civil Rules, submitted the final draft of the proposed
amendment to rule 52(a) to the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference.' 68 The Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure recommended approval by the Judicial Confer-
ence and transmittal to the Supreme Court for its consideration.169
The final draft of the proposed amendment modifies the present
rule to provide that "[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credi-
bility of the witnesses."' 170 The Advisory Committee indicated three
purposes of the proposed amendment:
(1) to avoid continued confusion and conflicts among the
circuits as to the standard of appellate review of findings of fact
by the court, (2) to eliminate the disparity between the standard
of review as literally stated in Rule 52(a) and the practice of
some courts of appeals, and (3) to promote nationwide
uniformity. 17'
Recognizing that the argument behind de novo review is that rule
52(a) does not apply when findings of fact are based on an evaluation of
documentary evidence, the Advisory Committee stated that this argu-
ment was outweighed "by the public interest in the stability and judicial
economy that would be promoted by recognizing that the trial court, not
the appellate tribunal, should be the finder of facts."17 2 The Advisory
Committee found that to allow de novo review would undermine the le-
gitimacy of district courts, multiply appeals by encouraging retrial of
facts, and needlessly reallocate judicial authority.' 73
B. Impact Of the Proposed Amendment
Since the preliminary draft of the proposed amendment to rule
52(a) was published in August 1983,174 two circuits have cited the pro-
168. Letter from Walter R. Mansfield, Chairman, Advisory Committee of
Civil Rules, to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (July 18,
1984).
169. Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure (1984).
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (Proposed Amendments 1984) (emphasis in orig-
inal indicating new language).
171. Id. advisory committee note.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 359 (1983). The pertinent provision of the pre-
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posed amendment in support of the application of the clearly erroneous
standard of review to findings of fact based on documentary
evidence. 175
In Dothan Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States,176 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit relied upon the preliminary draft of the proposed amendment in
applying the clearly erroneous standard of review. In Dothan plaintiffs
sued for an income tax refund on the ground that the Internal Revenue
Service erred in classifying plaintiffs as personal holding companies. 177
The district court, relying on documents and transcripts from an earlier
suit involving another taxpayer in an identical situation,178 held for the
plaintiffs. 179 The factual issue on appeal was whether payments that
plaintiff had received were rent for tangible assets or royalty for its
Coca-Cola franchise. 180 The government argued that the court should
review the findings of fact free of the clearly erroneous standard of re-
view or, at the least, under "an 'ameliorated clearly erroneous' standard
of review."'18 1 While indicating that prior decisions within the Eleventh
Circuit applied an ameliorated standard of review,' 8 2 the court relied on
liminary draft provided: "findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evi-
dence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the wit-
nesses and to the need for finality." Id. (emphasis in original indicating new lan-
guage). The final draft of the proposed amendment dropped the phrase "and to
the need for finality." For a discussion of the final draft of the proposed amend-
ment, see supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text. All the cases citing the
proposed amendment cited to the preliminary draft, not the final draft. See
Dothan Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 745 F.2d 1400, 1403 (11 th Cir.
1984); Antilles Steamship Co. v. Members of the American Hull Ins. Syndicate,
733 F.2d 195, 203 n. I (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman, J., concurring); Nissho-Iwai Co.
v. M/" Stolt Lion, 719 F.2d 34, 39 n.3 (2d Cir. 1983).
175. See Dothan Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 745 F.2d 1400
(1 th Cir. 1984); Nissho-Iwai Co. v. M/T Stolt Lion, 719 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983).
176. 745 F.2d 1400 (11 th Cir. 1984).
177. Id. at 1401. Plaintiffs had paid a 70% penalty tax imposed on personal
holding companies prior to the suit. Id. Plaintiffs had never actively operated as
bottling companies, but rather had leased their tangible assets and sublicensed
their right to bottle and sell Coca-Cola to affiliated partnerships. Id. The gov-
ernment contended that these payments represented a royalty, thus making
plaintiffs a personal holding company. Id. at 1402. The plaintiffs asserted that
the payments constituted compensation for the use of tangible property. Id.
178. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 615 F.2d 1318 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
Both parties stipulated to use of the record from the prior suit providing that the
district court could consider the transcript as applicable in all relevant aspects to
the parties involved in the present suit. 745 F.2d at 1402.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1401.
181. Id. at 1402. The court commented that "[t]he key to this appeal is the
standard of review that should be given to the district court's determination."
Id.
182. See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343,
1348-49 (11 th Cir. 1982) (affirming the lower court's finding that an arbitration
clause did not apply, court stated that when the finding of fact is solely based on
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the preliminary draft of the proposed amendment and its Advisory Note,
as well as the Gypsum decision, in applying the clearly erroneous stan-
dard. 18 3 The court went on to state that even if it accepted an amelio-
rated clearly erroneous standard of review when evidence was entirely
documentary, the present case was distinct since the parties stipulated to
the use of transcripts from an earlier proceeding. It would be inefficient,
the court reasoned, to order a second live presentation of the witnesses
for the sole purpose of applying the normal clearly erroneous standard
of review. 18 4 In conclusion, the court held that the district court's find-
ings of fact were not clearly erroneous. 185
In Nissho-Iwai Co. v. M/T Stolt Lion, 186 the Second Circuit, per Judge
Mansfield, Chairman of the Advisory Committee of Civil Rules, indi-
cated that it might be departing from its history of applying de novo re-
view to findings of fact based on documentary evidence.' 8 7 In Nissho-
Iwai, the plaintiff brought an action against defendant shipowner, seek-
ing damages for discoloration of cargo.18 8 A district judge tried the
case on a record primarily consisting of deposition transcripts and docu-
ments,' 8 9 and found that plaintiff failed to established a prima facie
case. 190 The Second Circuit remanded for additional findings of fact
depositions, affidavits, and documents, "the burden of establishing clear error is
not so heavy, and the clearly erroneous rule is somewhat ameliorated . . .").
183. 745 F.2d at 1403. The court relied on the reasoning of the Advisory
Committee Note, which it quoted at length, and on the interest in finality, in
applying the clearly erroneous standard. Id. It should be noted that reference
to a "need for finality" has been deleted from the final draft of the proposed
amendment. See supra note 174.
The court also quoted the definition of clearly erroneous found in Gypsum.
745 F.2d at 1403 (quoting Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395) ("although there is evidence
to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed"). The court commented
that the Supreme Court has "never intimated that a lesser standard applies
where a trial court's determination is based solely upon documentary evidence."
Id. But see Bose Corp., 104 S. Ct. at 1959 ("the presumption has lesser force in the
former situation [total documentary evidence] than in the latter [oral]").
184. 745 F.2d at 1403-04. In the analogous case, the court of claims had
indicated that "the presumption of correctness can be applied less stringently to
documentary evidence"; however, the Eleventh Circuit rejected this view in the
present case. Id. at 1404 (quoting Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 615
F.2d 1318, 1322 (Ct. Cl. 1980)).
185. Id.
186. 719 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1983).
187. Id. at 38-39. For a discussion of de novo review in the Second Circuit,
see supra notes 115-28 and accompanying text.
188. Id. at 35-36. The facts indicate that the pipe which defendant used to
move the cargo had a leak that allowed the cargo to become contaminated and
discolored. Id. at 36.
189. Id. at 36. The only live testimony was one expert who testified briefly.
Id. For the second remand, further discovery was taken and additional deposi-
tion testimony was received. Id. at 37.
190. Id. at 36. The district judge held that plaintiff was required to prove
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under a different burden of proof.19 1 The district court again found
that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case.' 9 2 On appeal, the
court recognized that in the past it had scrutinized findings of fact more
closely when they were based on documentary evidence.19 3 The court
went on to conclude, however, that its function was to review questions
of law; it would defer, when reasonably possible, to the district court's
findings of fact. 194 The court noted for support that the preliminary
draft of the proposed amendment to rule 52(a) sought to preserve the
separation of functions between district and appellate courts.' 9 5 The
court, however, concluded that this case was a rare instance where it
would make its own determinations because of the districts court's con-
tinued failure to make credibility determinations and to apply the con-
trolling principle of law. 196 The Second Circuit thus reversed and
remanded with directions to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff.' 9 7
V. ANALYSIS
Adoption of the proposed amendment to rule 52(a) will end the
practice in some circuits of applying de novo review to findings of fact
based on documentary evidence. As exemplified by Dothan and Nissho-
Iwai, the proposed amendment has had a direct effect on circuits which
not just fault, but fault on the part of the defendant in the discharge of the
cargo, which he failed to do. Id.
191. Id. at 37. The Second Circuit held that plaintiff was not required to
prove defendant's fault, but only to make out a prima facie case by demonstrat-
ing that the defendant took the cargo in good condition and discharged it in a
discolored condition. Id.
192. Id. at 38. The district court did not discredit the plaintiff's witness, but
held that any discoloration which plaintiff's witness observed was insufficient to
establish plaintiff's prima facie case. Id.
193. Id. at 38-39 (citing Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ
Co., 604 F.2d 755, 758 (2d Cir. 1979);J. Gerber & Co. v. S.S. Sabine Howaldt,
437 F.2d 580, 586 (2d Cir. 1971) (since the evidence was presented by deposi-
tions, the court was "in as good a position as the trial court to examine, inter-
pret, and draw inferences.
194. Id. at 39.
195. Id. at 39 n.3 (citing Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 359 (1983)). The court only
quoted the "whether based on oral or documentary evidence" of the preliminary
draft, which is in accord with the final draft of the proposed amendments. For a
discussion of the differences between the preliminary draft and the final draft,
see supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
196. 719 F.2d at 40. It is submitted that the primary reason that the court
employed full review was the failure of the district court to abide by its instruc-
tions after the first remand. The court concluded that the district court "erred
as a matter of law in deciding that [plaintiff] had failed to make out a prima facie
case." Id. (emphasis added). It is further submitted that Nissho-Iwai marks a
clear departure from the Second Circuit line of cases following Orvis v. Higgins,
180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1950). For a discussion of Orris v. Higgins, see supra notes
115-123 and accompanying text.
197. 719 F.2d at 41.
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had not consistently applied the clearly erroneous standard of review in
the past.198 Accepting the proposed amendment, two questions remain.
First, is the abandonment of de novo review proper? Second, will the
modified clearly erroneous standard of review survive the amendment to
rule 52(a)?
First, it is submitted that abandonment of de novo review is proper
for several reasons. The foremost rationale for the proposed amend-
ment is that it properly allocates judicial resources between district and
appellate courts, and preserves the judicial structure in all nonjury
cases. 199 As the Second Circuit stated in Nissho-Iwai, the function of trial
courts is to determine questions of fact, while the function of appellate
courts is to review questions of law. 200 As Judge Duniway suggested in
Lundgren, if an appellate court is to make its own findings of fact, then
the requirement in rule 52(a) that a trial court "find facts specially" is
rendered moot.2 0 1 While there is merit to the argument that if the evi-
dence is documentary the reviewing court should make its own finding
to insure that justice is done,20 2 this analysis damages the structure and
function of the federal system in which deference is to be given to the
district judge.2 03 It is submitted that the appropriate function of appel-
late courts in all nonjury cases is solely to determine whether there is
sufficient support in the record for the findings of fact.
It is further submitted that the Supreme Court has always mandated
application of the clearly erroneous standard to all findings of fact,
whether based on documentary or oral evidence. Beginning with Gyp-
sum and continuing through Bose, the Supreme Court has never sug-
198. For a discussion of Dothan and Nissho-Iwai, see supra notes 176-97 and
accompanying text.
199. See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) advisory committee note (Proposed Amend-
ment 1984).
200. 719 F.2d at 39 & n.3 ("Since our function is to review questions of law,
• . . we prefer, when reasonably possible, to defer to the district court's findings
of fact.") (citing Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 359 (1983)). See also R. POUND, supra
note 6, at 300 ("the primary work of the [appellate] courts was to find and de-
clare the law . . ."); Wright, supra note 4, at 766.
201. 307 F.2d at 114. Rule 52(a) provides in part that "the court shall find
the facts specially and state separately its conclusion of law thereon...." FED.
R. Civ. P. 52(a). It is submitted that if a reviewing court made its own findings of
fact, this portion of rule 52(a) would have no significance.
202. See Wright, supra note 4, at 779-82 (discussing whether a secondary
function of appellate courts is to ensure that justice is done in a particular case;
concluding that the price ofjustice is too great and only the rich, who can afford
appeal, reap the benefits of this justice). It is further submitted that appellate
courts can adequately administer justice within the parameters of the clearly er-
roneous standard of review.
203. See Chesnut, supra note 37, at 540-41; Wright, supra note 4, at 781("federal district judges are generally believed to be men of much ability, rightly
entitled to the greatest respect"). See also Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d at 542
(Chase, J., dissenting) ("Though trial judges may at times be mistaken as to
facts, appellate judges are not always omniscient.").
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gested that de novo review applies to findings of fact.2 0 4 The findings of
fact in both Gypsum and Pullman-Standard were based primarily on docu-
mentary evidence, and in both of these cases the Supreme Court held
that the clearly erroneous standard of review applied. 20 5 Proponents of
de novo review, in distinguishing Supreme Court cases, have focused on
the Court's emphasis on credibility determinations by the trial judge,
and have claimed that rule 52(a) applies only in instances where the trial
judge must make such determinations. 20 6 It is submitted that the
Court's emphasis on this factor was never intended to indicate a limita-
tion on the application of the clearly erroneous standard such that
courts would apply a different standard of review in "paper cases" as
compared with cases where oral testimony is heard.20 7 Rather, it is sub-
mitted that the Supreme Court was only emphasizing what the rule says,
that "[flindings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous,
and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to
judge of the credibility of the witnesses."120 8 The Court was not placing
a condition precedent on application of the rule, but merely interpreting
what the rule literally meant. To apply de novo review runs counter to
Supreme Court precedent.
It is finally submitted that the very difference between the pre- and
post-Federal Rules of Civil Procedure judicial systems requires applica-
tion of the clearly erroneous standard of review to all findings of fact.
Prior to 1936, the federal courts operated under a dual system consist-
ing of actions at law and actions in equity.2 0 9 In the dual system, it was
possible to differentiate between the standards of review applicable to
204. For a discussion of the Supreme Court decisions discussing this issue,
see supra notes 48-73 and accompanying text.
205. In Gypsum, the government's evidence consisted of 600 documents and
28 witnesses. 333 U.S. at 372. In Pullman-Standard, the findings of fact were
made on the basis of exhibits. Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 529
(5th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 456 U.S. 273 (1981). For a discussion of the Gypsum and
Pullman-Standard decisions, see supra notes 48-55 & 63-69 and accompanying
text.
206. See, e.g., Miller v. Commissioner, 327 F.2d 846 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 816 (1964) (court applied de novo review after finding that the factors
cited by the Duberstein court as warrenting heavy reliance on the trier of fact-
taking testimony, observing documents, and apportioning credibility-were not
present).
207. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1965). In
General Motors, the Court never intimated that the clearly erroneous standard did
not apply to "paper cases." For a discussion of General Motors, see supra notes 58-
61 and accompanying text.
208. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). See Wright, supra note 4, at 769-70. Professor
Wright contends that the rule places two separate restrictions on appellate review.
Id. at 769. He asserts that proponents of de novo review incorrectly read the rule
as though it said: "Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous if the trial court has had an opportunity to judge the credibility of the wit-
nesses." Id. at 769-70 (emphasis in original).
209. For a discussion of federal judicial practice prior to 1936, see supra
notes 6-33 and accompanying text.
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each of the two causes of action. 2 10 The purpose of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure was to eliminate this dual system and provide for uni-
form procedural rules. 2 1' It is submitted that since a premium has been
placed on uniformity in the federal judicial system since 1936, the pre-
1936 arguments in favor of de novo review carry no weight. Prior to
1936, de novo review was applied to actions in equity where evidence was
entirely documentary because the reviewing court was in the same posi-
tion as the trial court in reviewing the evidence. There was no compet-
ing goal of uniformity to interfere with the selection of a standard of
review for findings of fact. It is submitted that the promulgation of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided a new goal-uniformity-
which superseded the rationale in support of de novo review, and thus
there was no overriding rationale for transferring the equity practice of
de novo review to post-1936 federal judicial practice. For the foregoing
reasons, it is submitted that abandonment of de novo review of findings
of fact based on documentary evidence is appropriate and long overdue.
Second, it is submitted that the modified clearly erroneous standard
will survive the passage of the amendment to rule 52(a). The primary
reason that courts should continue to apply this standard is that, as it is
applied in several circuits, the modified standard is in essence merely a
restatement of the normal clearly erroneous standard as it applies to
cases where there is no oral evidence to trigger the operation of the
second clause of rule 52(a). Thus, circuits adhering to the modified
standard apply the clearly erroneous standard and append an explicit
assertion that the burden of proving a finding of fact clearly erroneous is
lessened because the absence of oral testimony made it unnecessary for
the trial judge to make any credibility determinations. In addition, cir-
cuit courts that have applied a modified clearly erroneous standard of
review continue to state that the findings cannot be overturned unless,
upon review of the evidence, the court is left with "a definite and firm
conviction" that a mistake has been committed by the trial court.2 12
Moreover, continuing application of the modified clearly erroneous
standard is supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Bose, in which
Justice Stevens asserted the presumption of correctness has "lesser
force" in documentary cases than in cases based on oral testimony. 2 13
210. It is submitted that the very nature of a dual system required appellate
courts to make classifications, and therefore classifications as to the applicable
standard of review were both logical and known by the parties.
211. For a discussion of the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Onaway, 695 F.2d at 200 ("we can overturn such findings of
fact only if upon reviewing 'the entire evidence' we are 'left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed' ") (quoting McAllister v.
United States, 348 U.S. 19, 20 (1954)).
213. Bose, 104 S. Ct. at 1959. The Court commented that the "requirement
that special deference be given to a trial judge's credibility determinations is
itself a recognition of the broader proposition that the presumption of correctness
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In conclusion, it is submitted that the modified clearly erroneous
standard is not different from the clearly erroneous standard; rather, the
modified clearly erroneous standard only recognizes that because no
credibility determinations have been made by the district court, the ap-
pellate court reviews the evidence unconcerned about assessments by
the trial court which the appellate court cannot review. It is therefore
slightly easier to hold a finding clearly erroneous when all of the trial
court's assessments and findings are before the appellate court.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proposed amendment to rule 52(a) will resolve the disagree-
ment between the courts of appeals over the appropriate standard of
review of findings of fact based upon documentary evidence. By termi-
nating the use of de novo review, the amendment promotes uniformity
and preserves the deference which should be accorded to trial judges'
decisions. While courts will no longer employ a de novo standard of re-
view, courts may and should continue to employ both a modified clearly
erroneous standard of review and the traditional clearly erroneous stan-
dard of review. By lessening the burden of proof, justice is promoted
without forfeiting the uniformity which is vital under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.
Kevin P. Robins
that attaches to factual findings is stronger in some cases than in others." Id. (emphasis
added). It is submitted that this lessening of presumptions is exactly what is
incorporated in the modified clearly erroneous standard. See Oscar Gruss & Son
v. First Bank, 582 F.2d 424, 431 (7th Cir. 1978) ("While the force of the rule
[52(a)] may be 'less inhibiting' . . . [findings] cannot be set aside unless the
appellate court can 'come to a definite and firm conviction that an error [was]
committed in the findings. ... ) (deletion by Gruss court) (quoting Mercantile
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